Data disc modulation for minimizing pirating and/or unauthorized copying and/or unauthorized access of/to data on/from data media including compact discs and digital versatile discs

ABSTRACT

The present invention relates to a method and system for authenticating a media and/or the data stored on the media in order to prevent piracy and/or unauthorized access and/or unauthorized copying of the data stored on the media, including CDs and DVDs. According to the present invention, there are three ways that authentication keys can be formed and remain hidden without being transferred in the audio/video. These three methods are employed using conventional hardware and/or software in CD or DVD players, which may optionally be modified. Each method of producing authentication keys according to the present invention is a function of the physical characteristics of a disc that does not normally travel with the audio or video or graphics data. Authentication systems of the present invention optionally encompass singular, multiple or multi-level authentication systems, each of which successively must be deciphered before the audio/video is finally available, or, alternatively where each key component must be found in order to build the whole key to perform the entire decryption or authentication process.

RELATED APPLICATION

This application claims priority from U.S. provisional Application No.60/086,132, filed on May 20, 1998, which is incorporated herein byreference.

FIELD OF INVENTION

This invention relates generally to anti-data pirating technology. Morespecifically, the invention relates to data disc modulation forpreventing piracy and/or unauthorized access and/or unauthorized copyingof data, such as audio and/or video data from a data source, such ascompact discs (CDs), digital versatile discs, (DVDs), hard drive discs,an Internet Service Provider (ISP) data source, and other data discsand/or data sources via direct connection, or via a local and/or globalnetwork, such as the Internet.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

There are two basic methods for recording sound and music—analog anddigital. See e.g. Ken C. Pohlmann, “The Compact Disc”, THE COMPUTERMUSIC & DIGITAL AUDIO SERIES, Volume 5. The above-mentioned audioseries, which was published by A-R Editions, Inc., in Madison, Wis., is,along with all volumes therein, incorporated by reference.

In analog recording, the recording medium (a tape) varies continuouslyaccording to the sound signal. In other words, an analog tape storessound signals as a continuous stream of magnetism. The magnetism, whichmay have any value within a limited range, varies by the same amount asthe sound signal voltage.

In digital recording, the sound signal is sampled electronically andrecorded as a rapid sequence of separately coded measurements. In otherwords, a digital recording comprises rapid measurements of a soundsignal in the form of on-off binary codes represented by ones and zeros.In this digital system, zeros are represented by indentations or pits ina disc surface, and ones are represented by unpitted surfaces or landreflections of the disc, such that a compact disc contains a spiraltrack of binary codes in the form of sequences of minute pits producedby a laser beam.

Music that is input to a digital recording and the requisite series ofreproduction processes, must pass through the recording side of a pulsecode modulation (PCM) system. A master recording of the music is storedin digital form on a magnetic tape or optical disc. Once the magnetictape has been recorded, mixed and edited, it is ready for reproductionas a CD. The CD manufacturer then converts the master tape to a masterdisc, which is replicated to produce a desired number of CDs. At the endof the PCM system is the reproduction side, the CD player, which outputsthe pre-recorded music.

If digital technology is used in all intermediate steps between therecording and reproduction sides of the PCM system, music remains inbinary code throughout the entire chain; music is converted to binarycode when it enters the recording studio, and stays in binary code untilit is converted back to analog form when it leaves the CD player and isaudible to the listener. In most CD players, digital outputs therefrompreserve data in its original form until the data reaches the poweramplifier, and the identical audio information recorded in the studio isthereby preserved on the disc.

Optical Storage

The physical specifications for a compact disc system are shown in PriorArt FIG. 1. They were developed jointly by Sony and Philips, and aredefined in the standards document entitled Red Book, which isincorporated herein by reference. The CD standard is also contained inthe International Electrotechnical Commission standard entitled, CompactDisc Digital Audio System, also incorporated herein by reference. Discmanufacturers, as well as CD player manufacturers, must obtain a CDlicense to use these specifications.

All disc dimensions, including those pertaining to pit and physicalformations, which encode data, are defined in the CD standard. Forexample, specifications information on sampling frequency, quantizationword length, data rate, error correction code, and modulation scheme areall defined in the standard. Properties of the optical system that readsdata from the disc using a leaser beam are also defined in the standard.Moreover, basis specifications relevant to CD player design is locatedin the signal format specifications.

Referring to Prior Art FIG. 2, the physical characteristics of thecompact disc surface structure are described. Each CD is less than 5inches in diameter whose track thickness is essentially thinner than ahair and whose track length averages approximately 3 and a half miles.The innermost portion of the disc is a hole, with a diameter of 15 mm,that does not hold data. The hole provides a clamping area for the CDplayer to hold the CD firmly to the spindle motor shaft.

Data is recorded on a surface area of the disc that is 35.5 mm wide. Alead-in area rings the innermost data area, and a lead-out area ringsthe outermost area. Both lead-in and lead-out areas contain non-audiodata used to control the CD player. Generally, a change in appearance inthe reflective data surface of a disc marks the end of musicalinformation.

A transparent plastic substrate comprises most of the CD's 1.2 mmthickness. Viewing a magnified portion of the CD surface, as shown inPrior Art FIG. 2, the top surface of the CD is covered with a very thinmetal layer of generally aluminum, silver or gold. Data is physicallycontained in pits impressed along the CD's top surface. Above thismetalized pit surface and disc substrate lies another thin protectivelacquer coating (10 to 30 micrometers). An identifying label (5micrometers) is printed on top of the lacquer coating.

A system of mirrors and lenses sends a beam of laser light to read thedata. A laser beam is applied to the underside of a CD and passesthrough the transparent substrate and back again. The beam is focused onthe metalized data surface that is sandwiched or embedded inside thedisc. As the disc rotates, the laser beam moves across the disc from thecenter to the edge. This beam produces on-off code signals that areconverted into, for example, a stereo electric signal.

The Pit Track

Prior Art FIG. 3 shows a typical compact disc pit surface. Each CDcontains a track of pits arranged in a continuous spiral that runs fromthe inner circumference to the outer edge. The starting point begins atthe inner circumference because, in some manufacturing processes, tracksat the outer diameter of a CD are more generally prone to manufacturingdefects. Therefore, CDs with shorter playing time provide a greatermanufacturing yield, which has led to adoption of smaller diameter discs(such as 8 cm CD-3 discs) or larger diameter discs (such as 20 and 30 cmCD-Video discs).

Prior Art FIG. 4 shows a diagram of a typical track pitch. The distancebetween successive tracks is 1.6 micrometers. That adds up toapproximately 600 tracks per millimeter. There are 22,188 revolutionsacross a disc's entire signal surface of 35.5 millimeters. Hence, a pittrack may contain 3 billion pits. Because CDs are constructed in adiffraction-limited manner—creating the smallest formations of the wavenature of light—track pitch acts as a diffraction grating; namely, byproducing a rainbow of colors. In fact, CD pits are among the smallestof all manufactured formations.

The linear dimensions of each track on a CD is the same, from thebeginning of a spiral to the end. Consequently, each CD must rotate withconstant linear velocity, a condition whereby uniform relative velocityis maintained between the CD and the pickup.

To accomplish this, the rotational speed of a CD varies depending on theposition of the pickup. The disc rotates at a playing speed which variesfrom 500 revolutions per minute at the center, where the track starts,to 200 revolutions per minute at the edge. This difference in speed isaccounted for by the number of tracks at each position.

For example, because each outer track revolution contains more pits thaneach inner track revolution, the CD must be slowed down as it plays inorder to maintain a constant rate of data. So, when the pickup isreading the inner circumference of the CD, the disc rotates at thehigher speed of 500 rpm. And as the pickup moves outwardly towards thedisc's edge, the rotational speed gradually decreases to 200 rpm. Thus,a constant linear velocity is maintained, such that all of the pits areread at the same speed. The CD player constantly reads fromsynchronization words from the data and adjusts the disc speed to keepthe data rate constant.

A CD's constant linear velocity (CLV) system is significantly differentfrom an LP's system. A major difference stems from the fact that aturntable's motor rotates at a constant velocity rate of 33⅓ grooves.This translates into outer grooves having a greater apparent velocitythan inner grooves, probably explained by the occurrence thathigh-frequency responses of inner grooves is inferior to that of outergrooves. If a CD used constant angular velocity (CAV) as opposed to theCLV system, pits on the outside diameter would have to be longer thanpits on the inner diameter of the disc. This latter scenario wouldresult in decreased data density and decreased playing time of a CD.

Like constant linear velocity, light beam modulation is also importantto the optical read-out system that decodes the tracks. See Prior ArtFIG. 5. A brief theoretical discussion on the distinctions between pitand land light travel explains this point.

Generally, when light passes from one medium to another with a differentindex of refraction, the light bends and its wavelength changes. Thevelocity at which light passes is important, because when velocity isslow, the beam bends and focusing occurs. Owing to several factors, suchas the refractive index, disc thickness and laser lens aperture, thelaser beam's size on the disc surface is approximately 800 μm. However,the laser beam is focused to approximately 1.7 μm at the pit surface. Inother words, the laser beam is focused to a point that is a littlelarger than a pit width. This condition minimizes the effects of dust orscratches on the CD's outer surface, because the size of dust particlesor scratches are effectively reduced along with the laser beam. Anyobstruction less than 0.5 ml are essentially insignificant and causes noerror in the readout.

As previously noted, a CD's entire pit surface is metalized. Inaddition, the reflective flat surface between each pit,(i.e. a land),causes almost 90 percent of laser light to be reflected back into thepickup. Looking at a spiral track from a laser's perspective on theunderside of a disc, as shown in Prior Art FIG. 5, pits appears asbumps. The height of each bump is generally between 0.11 and 0.13 μm,such that this dimension is smaller than the laser beam's wavelength(780 nanometers) in air. The dimension of the laser beam's wavelength inair is larger than the laser's wavelength (500 nanometers) inside thedisc substrate, with a refractive index of 1.55. In short, the height ofeach bump is, therefore, one-quarter of the laser's wavelength in thesubstrate.

Scientifically, this means that light striking a land will travel twiceas far than light striking a bump. This discrepancy in light traveldistances serve to modulate the intensity of a light beam. This allowsdata physically encoded on the disc to be recoverable by the laser.

Also, the pits and intervening reflective lands on the disc's surface donot directly designate ones and zeros. Rather, it is each pit's edge,whether leading or trailing, that is a 1 and all areas in between,whether inside or outside a pit, that are designated as zeros. Still,each pit and reflective land lengths vary incrementally. Thecombinations of 9 different pit and land lengths of varying dimensionsphysically encode the data.

Error Correction

Error correction is one of the major advantages of digital audio storagemedia, such as compact discs, over analog media, like LPS. Errorcorrection simply corrects the error.

When an LP is scratched, for instance, the grooves are irrevocablydamaged, along with the information contained in them. On every replayof that record, there will be a click or pop when the damaged part ofthe groove passes beneath the needle.

This is not the case for CDs. The data on every disc is speciallyencoded with an error correction code. When a scratched CD is played,the CD player uses the error correction code to perform error correctionevery time the disc is played. Thus, it delivers the original undamageddata, instead of the damaged data.

CD Player Overview

The CD player contains two primary systems: an audio data processingsystem and a control system. Prior Art FIG. 6 depicts a block diagram ofa CD player showing an audio path as well as servo and controlfunctions. Generally, the data path, which directs modulated light fromthe pickup through a series of processing circuits, consists of severalelements that ultimately produces a stereo analog signal. These elementsof the data path include a data separator, buffer, de-interleaving RAM,error correction circuit, concealment circuit, oversampling filter,digital-to-analog (D/A) converters, and output filters.

The servo and control system, in addition to a display system, directsthe mechanical operation of the CD player, such as the player's spindledrive, and auto-tracking and auto-focusing functions. The servo, controland display system also directs the user interface to the CD player'scontrols and displays.

A CD player uses a sophisticated optical read-out system to read data,control motor speed, track the pit spiral and adjust pickup positionsand timings. While a spindle motor is used to rotate the disc withconstant linear velocity, in another servo loop, information from thedata itself determines correct rotating speed and data output rate.

User controls and their interface to the player's circuitry is monitoredby a microprocessor. A software program controls several modes of playeroperation. Subcode data is also used to direct the pickup to the properdisc location. For example, a time code is used to locate the start ofany track.

Once data is recovered from the CD, the player must go through a seriesof activities to decode audio information in order to reconstruct anaudio signal; namely, the EFM (eight-to-fourteen modulation) data ismodulated, and errors are detected and corrected using an errorcorrection algorithm. Additionally, using interpolation and muting, theaudibility of gross errors is minimized.

Subsequent to decoding of the audio information, the digital data mustbe converted to a stereo analog signal. This conversion process requiresone or two D/A converters and low-pass filters (in analog or digitaldomain).

An audio de-emphasis circuit exists in the audio output stages of CDevery player. Some CDs are configured for improved signal-to-noiseratio. This configuration is accomplished by encoding the CD with anaudio pre-emphasis flag in the subcode, where high frequencies on amaster tape is slightly boosted (50/15 μs characteristic). The result,on CD playback, is inverse attenuation of the disc's high frequencies,because the player switches in the de-emphasis circuit when required, sothat the signal-to-noise ratio is slightly improved.

The final output circuit is the buffer, which ensures that the CDplayer's line level output is appropriate to drive necessary externalamplifiers with a minimum amount of analog distortion.

Pickup Design

With-respect to a player's pickup design, a CD may contain as many asthree billion pits, all orderly arranged on a spiral track. Each opticalread-out system, which comprises an entire lens assembly and pickup,must focus, track and read data stored on a spiral track. The lensassembly, which is a combination of the laser beam and a reader, must besmall enough to move across the underside of a disc in response totracking information and user random-access programming. Moreover,movement of the pickup from a CD's center to its edge must be focuseddespite adverse playing conditions, such as when a CD is dirty orvibrating.

Auto-Tracking

Unlike an LP, which has grooves to guide the pickup, a CD has a singularspiral pit track running from a center circle to its outer edge. Theonly object that touches the disc surface is an intensity-modulatedlaser light, which carries data and which is susceptible toobstructions, such as vibrations. Four standard methods have beendesigned for tracking pit spiral: (1) one-beam push-pull; (2) one-beamdifferential phase detection; (3) one-beam high frequency wobble; and(4) three-beam.

Auto-Focusing

The optical pickup must be precise in order to accommodate approximately600,000 pits per second. Even the flattest disc is not perfectly flat;disc specifications acknowledge this by allowing for a verticaldeflection of ±600 μm. In addition, a ±2 μm tolerance is required forthe laser beam to stay focused, otherwise the phase interference betweendirected and reflected light is lost, along with audio data, trackingand focusing information. Therefore, the objective lens must be able tore-focus while the disc's surface deviates vertically.

An auto-focus system, driven by a servo motor, manages this deviation,using control electronics and a servo motor to drive the objective lens.Three techniques are available for generating a focusing signal: (1) acylindrical lens using astigmatism; (2) a knife edge using Foucaultfocusing; and (3) critical angle focusing.

Any pickup must perform both tracking and focusing functionssimultaneously. Therefore, a completed pickup design would use acombination of the above-mentioned auto-tracking and auto-focusingtechniques. Two standard pickup designs stand out from the rest whenauto-tracking and auto-focusing functions are combined: (1) one-beampush-pull tracking with Foucault focusing, (hereinafter “one-beampickup”); and (2) three-beam tracking with astigmatic focusing,(hereinafter “three-beam pickup”).

Both of these designs have been commercialized among manufacturers.One-beam pickups, which are usually mounted on a distal end of apivoting arm, swings the pickup across a disc in an arc. On the otherhand, three-beam pickups are mounted on a sled, which slides linearlyacross the disc.

The following exemplary prior art discussion will be limited tothree-beam pickups only.

Three-Beam Pickup Optical Design

Prior Art FIG. 7 shows the optical path of a three-beam pickup, whichuses a laser as the light source. A laser is used, rather than a bulb,for a number of reasons. First, a laser uses an optical resonator tostimulate atoms to a higher energy level that induces them to radiate inphase, a condition necessary to achieving sharper data surface focus andproper intensity modulation from the pit height.

Second, a laser light, unlike a bulb's light, which radiates all thefrequencies of a spectrum at all different phases, is composed of asingle frequency and is coherent in phase. An important advantage ofphase coherency is phase cancellation in the beam that is produced bydisc pits, so that disc data can be read. Most CD pickups use analuminum gallium arsenide semiconductor laser with a 0.5 milliwattoptical output that radiates a coherent-phase laser beam with a 780nanometer wavelength; the beam is comprised of near-infrared light.

Referring to Prior Art FIG. 7, a laser diode is positioned adjacent thefocal point of a collimator lens with a long focal distance, for thepurpose of making the divergent light rays parallel. A monitor diode(not shown) is also placed adjacent the laser diode in order to controlpower to the laser. The monitor diode stabilizes the laser's output intwo important ways; first, by compensating for temperature changes so asto prevent thermal runaway; and second, by conducting current inproportion to the light output of the laser.

The three-beam pickup is so termed because it uses three beams fortracking and reading a CD. To generate these beams, a laser light firstpasses through a diffraction grating, which resembles a screen withevenly-spaced slits of a few laser wavelengths apart. As the beam passesthrough the grating, the light diffracts into fringes of parallel lightbeams. When the collection of these beams is re-focused, the collectionappears as a single, bright centered beam with a series of successivelyless intense beams on either side of the center beam.

It is this diffraction pattern that actually strikes the CD, where thecenter beam is used for both reading data and focusing. In a three-beampickup, two of the series of successively less intense beams, or twosecondary beams, are used for tracking only. In a one-beam pickup, datareading, focusing and tracking is accomplished with just one beam.

Another element in the three-beam optical design is the polarizationbeam splitter, or PBS, which consists of two prisms having a common 45degree facing that acts as a polarizing prism. The purpose of the PBS isto direct the laser light to the disc, and to angle the reflected light(from the disc) to the photosensor. In some designs, a half-silveredmirror is used.

In Prior Art FIG. 7, the collimator lens is shown as following the PBS,even though it can precede the PBS in other designs. Once the lightexits the collimator lens, it then passes through a quarter-wave plate(QWP). The QWP is an anisotropic material that exhibits properties withdifferent values when measured in different directions, so that whenlight passes through the QWP, it rotates the plane of polarization ofeach passing light beam. This rotation is required to make the PBS work.

The anisotropic quality of the quarter-wave plate is equally importantto the process occurring on the right-hand side of the plate. Lightpassing through the QWP to the CD, will be reflected from the CD backagain through the QWP and become polarized. More importantly, the lightis polarized in a plane at right angles to that of the incident light.

In other words, the reflected polarized light re-entering thequarter-wave plate (from right to left) will pass through the collimatorand strike the polarization beam splitter. Because the polarization beamsplitter passes light in one plane only (e.g., horizontally) butreflects light in the other plane (e.g., vertically), the PBS willproperly deflect the reflected beam toward the photodiode sensor to readthe digital data.

The final optics element in the path to the CD is the objective lens.The objective lens is used to focus laser beams into a convergent coneof light onto the CD's data surface, taking into account the refractiveindex of the polycarbonate substrate of the disc. Convergence is afunction of the numerical aperture (NA) of the lens, with most pickupsusing an objective lens having an NA of about 0.5.

As mentioned earlier, the laser beam's size on the outer surface of theCD's transparent polycarbonate substrate is approximately 800micrometers in diameter. Since the refractive index of the substrate is1.55 and its thickness is 1.2 millimeters, the laser beam's size isnarrowed to 1.7 micrometers at the reflective surface, a size slightlywider than the pit width of 0.5 micrometer and comparable in width tothe light's wavelength.

When the laser beam strikes a land, (the smooth surface between twopits), light is almost totally reflected. When the light strikes a pit(viewed as a bump by the laser), diffraction and destructiveinterference cause less light to be reflected.

In short, all three intensity-modulated light beams pass through theobjective lens, the QWP, collimator lens, and the PBS. Before hittingthe photodiode, they pass through a singlet lens and a cylindrical lens.

In any optical pickup system, automatic focusing is an absoluteprerequisite. Disc warpage and other irregularities causes verticaldeflections in the CD's data surface. Such movement would place the dataout of the pickup's depth of focus, essentially making it impossible forthe pickup to distinguish between pit height and land phase differences.

The unique properties of astigmatism are used to achieve auto-focusingin a three-beam CD player. This is illustrated in Prior Art FIG. 8.

The cylindrical lens, (see Prior Art FIG. 7), which prefaces thephotodiode array, detects an out-of-focus condition. The condition isdirectly related to the distance between the objective lens and the CD'sreflective surface. As this distance varies, the focal point changes,and the image projected by the cylindrical lens changes its shape. Theinter-relationship of the above elements is illustrated in Prior ArtFIG. 8.

Changes in an image on the photodiode generates a focus correctionsignal. For example, when the distance between the objective lens andthe CD decreases, the image projected by the lens moves further from thecylindrical lens, and the pattern becomes elliptical. Conversely, whenthe distance between the objective lens and the CD increases, the imageprojected by all lenses (e.g., the objective lens, an intermediateconvex lens and the cylindrical lens) moves closer to the lens. However,the elliptical pattern that is formed is now rotated 90 degrees from thefirst elliptical pattern.

In the third and final scenario, which is when the disc surface liesexactly at the focal point of the objective lens, the image reflectedthrough the intermediate convex lens and cylindrical lens is unchanged,and a circular spot strikes the center of the photodiode.

An important aspect of the three-beam auto-focus system is correctionvoltages. A photodiode uses a laser beam's intensity level to generate afocus correction voltage, which in turn generates a control signal.These electrical signals control the mechanical motion of a servo motor,which is responsible for moving the objective lens along an optical axisin response to any vertical disc motion. Servo-controlled movement ofthe objective lens during disc motion results in automatic focusing.

Prior Art FIG. 9 illustrates a typical servo motor used to move theobjective lens in the optical path. The servo motor consists of a coiland magnet structure generally used in loudspeakers.

Operation of a CD player begins when a CD is first loaded into theplayer. Technically, an electrical control signal is sent into theoptical pickup system, which causes the laser to turn on, and theobjective lens to move vertically until a focus condition is reached.

Then, the auto-focusing system takes over, except if two negativesituations occur. If no CD is detected, the automatic focusing systemtries again, and cuts off if it fails to detect a CD again. If theauto-focus is inoperative, such as when the CD tray is open, the systempulls back the objective lens to prevent damage to the lens or CD.Otherwise, the automatic focusing system performs its operation smoothlyby keeping the pickup properly positioned beneath the spinning disc, ineffect maintaining focus to within a tolerance of approximately ±0.5micrometers.

Content Scrambling System

Currently, encryption for data media, such as DVDs, involves one key. Itis a fairly simple 40-bit scheme. There is good authentication of theplatform, which is performed by various key exchanges within themechanisms between the source drive and the actual platform decryptingthe data.

A content scrambling system (CSS) is included in every DVD player. CSSis a method of encrypting a disc that the information technology (IT)and.motion picture industries agreed upon. In order to be licensed tomanufacture DVD players, a company is required to obey certain rulespertaining to the uses (and non-uses) that a platform can perform, aspart of a license agreement.

While the present invention is not required to incorporate the CSSencryption system, it could be one level of encryption, if a multi-levelencryption is employed. Audio information is generally encrypted priorto being burned into a disc, such as a CD. Hence, there is no plaintext; encrypted information only is contained on a CD. So, if a userseeks to access information contained on the CD, whether for listeningor copying purposes, the user would have to decrypt the data in order tohear sensible audio data.

In general, existing ideas in the field appear to bury authenticationkeys within encrypted information that is burned into the disc.Authentication keys are buried using various authentication processes,which verify that the platform device—whether a computer, CD player, DVDplayer, or the like—is a licensed device and, consequently, obeyscertain copyright rules. Eventually, the licensed device uncovers theburied authentication key(s) and decrypts the data contained on thedisc. So, the system needs to find the key before being eligible fordecrypting the audio data.

The following prior patents represent the state of the art of preventingunauthorized copying of data, and are all hereby incorporated byreference:

U.S. Pat. No. 4,811,325 to Sharples, Jr. et al. discloses high speedcopying of audio programs on optical CDs. The master CD is encoded usingAdaptive Delta Modulation (ADM).

U.S. Pat. No. 4,879,704 to Takaai et al. prevents copying of an opticaldis. Data is stored in a record protected area and in a recordunprotected area, where each such sector has a representative addressthat helps to determine whether the data is in the record protected areaor in the record unprotected area. Only data from the record unprotectedarea with an appropriate address can be copied.

U.S. Pat. No. 4,937,679 to Ryan discloses a video recording and copyprevention system. The video signal includes a copy-protect signal.Designated detectors detect the presence of copy-protected signal(s) andinhibit copying of such signals. A video correlate enables one toplayback a copy-protected program for viewing only and generates aninhibit signal to prevent copying of a copy-protected signal.

In U.S. Pat. No. 4,975,898 to Yoshida, an erasing program erases thenon-rewritable portion so that it cannot be copied on a copy disc duringunauthorized copying of an optical disc.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,319,735 to Preuss et al. uses a digital code signalembedded with the original audio signal. The digital code getstransferred to the copy disc.

In U.S. Pat. No. 5,412,718 to Narasimhalu et al., non-uniformities andtheir attributes in the storage medium is used as a unique signature.This signature is used to derive a key for encrypting the information onthe storage medium. During copying, the signature gets mutated and theinformation cannot be decrypted. During authorized copying, theinformation is decrypted by generating a key from the signature of thedistribution medium.

In U.S. Pat. No. 5,418,852 to Itami et al., data is stored in a useraccessible area and in a user inaccessible area, which are both comparedto determine the authenticity of the recording medium.

In U.S. Pat. No. 5,513,260 to Ryan, copy-protected CDs haveauthenticating signature recorded on them. An authentication signatureis obtained by a deliberately induced radial position modulation givingan error voltage corresponding to the elliptical errors. When playingthe CD, the signature causes the player to correctly decrypt the programwhereas, when playing an unauthorized copy of the CD, the absence of thesignature is detected and false data is generated and the player doesnot play.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,538,773 to Kondo discloses the recording of datatogether with a cipher key information for copy protection.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,570,339 to Nagano discloses a system that converts datato digital data, which is then FM modulated with key information to varythe widths of the pits at the time of recording. During reproduction,the data is read out and if the key information is determined to bemissing, copying is prevented.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,608,717 to Ito et al. discloses a CD-ROM that has acharacter/graphic pattern for copy protection. Password and informationon the position of the character/graphic pattern bearing area of theCD-ROM are stored beforehand in a memory included in the CD-ROM'scontroller of the playback system. The CD-ROM controller, therefore,will have the means for deciphering the enciphered password. Data aremodulated by the EFM modulation method into bits of predetermined widthand height having values corresponding to the EFM.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,608,718 to Schiewe discloses an optical disc havingshallow pits bearing an identification/logo/watermark. The lands andpits are of different lengths for identification/authorization purposeswhen copying a CD.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,636,276 to Brugger discloses the distribution of digitalmusic with copyright protection. An encryption table is embedded in themusic CD player and includes a decryption module that uses theencryption table for authorized playing of music/information.

U.S. Pat. No. 5,636,281 to Antonini discloses an authorized access thatuses mingling of data elements of the program memory to be protectedaccording to a secret order. To use this memory, a transcending deviceis used. The transcending device is in the form of a memory containingseveral tables, only one of which gives the right transcending dataelements.

The problem with one or more of the above-mentioned conventionalencryption/decryption systems is that a pirate or hacker seeking to hackinto the encryption process on a disc could do so by playing theencrypted music, finding the decryption key, which is already buried,mixed and interleaved with the audio data or the encrypted audio data,and using that key to decrypt the audio on the disc.

In other words, accompaniment of the decryption key within the audiodata lends itself to discovery, even if the audio data is played ortransmitted in an encrypted form. A hacker could obtain decryptionkey(s) even if the encrypted audio data was placed onto an unlicensedcomputer platform having a DVD ROM drive that did not obey copyrightprotection rules. That is, if the audio is later played back, the keywould be output along with the encrypted audio data.

An additional problem in one or more of the prior art references is thatkeys specific to, or derived from, the physical construction of the CDare not constructed or determined in a manner that is difficult todetect by a hacker. A further problem in the prior art is that thephysical characteristics of the CD which are used to derive a key forauthorized copying, are transferred in the audio and may be accessibleto the hacker.

Yet another problem in one or more of the prior art references is thatthe solutions proposed therein require significant additional hardwareand/or software to be implemented. That is, these prior art techniquesdo not take advantage of existing hardware/software within the CD or DVDplayer that can be used effectively to prevent unauthorized copying.

Yet another problem in one or more of the prior art references is thatthe solutions proposed therein are expensive, and incompatible withexisting CD or DVD players. Hence, current solutions to unauthorizedcopying are difficult and impractical in their implementation.

Yet another problem in one or more of the prior art references is thatthe solutions proposed therein are limited to CD and/or DVD players, anddo not consider or structure such techniques when data is transmittedfrom, to, and/or over local and/or global networks, such as theInternet.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is a feature and advantage of the present invention to provide amethod and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, or unauthorizedaccess to, data on a data media that is inexpensive, and compatible withexisting CD and/or DVD-players, and other forms of data recording and/orplaying devices.

It is another feature and advantage of the present invention to providea method and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, or unauthorizedaccess to, data on a data media that is manageable and practical in itsimplementation.

It is another feature and advantage of the present invention to providea method and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, or unauthorizedaccess to, data on a data media that does not require significantadditional hardware and/or software in its implementation.

It is another feature and advantage of the present invention toprovide.a method and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, orunauthorized access to, data on a data media that uses and/or adaptsexisting hardware/software within, for example, the CD or DVD playerthat can be used effectively to prevent unauthorized copying.

It is another feature and advantage of the present invention to providea method and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, or unauthorizedaccess to, data on a data media that uses or creates data keys specificto, or derived from, the physical construction of the CD or other datadisc in a manner that is difficult to detect by a hacker.

It is another feature and advantage of the present invention to providea method and/or apparatus for minimizing pirating of, or unauthorizedaccess to, data on a data media that uses the physical characteristicsof the CD to derive a key for authorized copying, and which key isprevented from being transferred in the audio and, therefore, notaccessible to the hacker.

The present invention relates to a method and system of preventingunauthorized copying of data on data media, including CDs and DVDs.Generally, an authorized CD is designed to require decoding by anauthorized disc player. The authorized CD includes certain informationused by an authorized CD player for playing music. An unauthorizedcopied CD, however, does not have the requisite encryption/decryptionkey(s) necessary for decoding.

Consequently, a feature and advantage of the present invention is toprevent piracy of audio and/or video data from data discs; that is, toprovide greatly enhanced security measures against data disc pirating.The present invention is based, in part, on my discovery that theauthorization key(s) need not necessarily be transferred in the audiousing conventional hardware and/or software in, for example, CD or DVDplayers that may be adapted in one or more ways described below.

The above features and advantages are accomplished generally by making aphysical mark on the media; a mark that would represent zeros and onesforming part of an authentication key or keys. Physical marking of thedata media is manifested in three different methods; namely, via pitwidth modulation, pit depth modulation and/or pit track modulation.

Singular or multi-level decryption systems may be used for preventingunauthorized copying of audio data on a disc. Similarly, two or threedifferent decryption systems, each of which successively must bedecrypted before the audio is finally available, may also be used.

Advantageously, the present invention optionally uses three or fourdifferent sources for making or compiling a long or compound keys. Thus,in other words, instead of having a multi-layered decryption orauthentication system, the present invention optionally includes amulti-level key, each component of which must be found in order to buildthe whole key to perform the entire authentication process.

According to the present invention, there are three ways that theseauthentication keys can be formed and remain hidden. Each method ofproducing authentication keys are a function of the physicalcharacteristics of a disc that does not normally travel with the audiodata. Each method generally makes a physical mark on the mediarepresenting zeros and ones, which form part of an authentication key.Moreover, the following three methods may be used individually and/or incombination to prevent piracy of audio and/or video data from discs,such as CDs, DVDs, and other data, discs.

The first method is pit width modulation, which requires, in the normallayers of a CD or DVD, a variation in the width of a pit. Variationspreferably occur within normal manufacturing tolerances of 10 to 15percent. A CD or DVD player would require an additional detector thatwould examine voltage irregularities resulting from width modulation.

Another method is pit depth modulation, by which variations in pit depthalso preferably occur in a predetermined physical manner within normalmanufacturing tolerances. According to this method, a disc player wouldnot register a disc's abnormal tolerances. The focus server, whichfocuses the layers contained on a disk, would supply a modulated voltageaccording to a pit depth modulation. The modulated voltage could then beused to obtain a key. For example, different predetermined modulatedvoltages may be indicative of different keys.

A third method is pit track modulation in which the smooth, continuousspiral is modulated on a very small level with data at low frequenciesrelative to the pit rate. It is also possible to modulate the spiral bylooking at the modulation of the tracking server in a player. The datais then built with a part of the key. Here, modulation also occurswithin normal manufacturing tolerances (e.g., ±10-15 percent) to avoidrunning the risk that existing players would not be able to track thedisc successfully.

The advantage of using one or more of the above three physical methodsof burying authentication key(s) on a disc is that it eliminates anobvious method that a pirate could use to reproduce discs. That is, apirate will have to initially produce a disc that meets the physicalpredetermined requirements of the disc to be copied, before being ableto copy therefrom.

For example, it is possible to get at the direct data output from a CDor DVD player before any of the demodulation processes occurs. This isaccomplished using the RF or FM method, where the data stream is copieddirectly from one disc to another disc by going to a direct data input.Thus, actual audio data stored on a disc can be easily transferred, bitfor bit or symbol for symbol, and copied onto another disc, because thedata being copied is a function of the actual audio encrypted datascreen; it is not a function of the pit width or track modulation.

The present invention, on the other hand, employs methods of producingauthentication keys that are a function of the physical characteristicsof a disc that do not travel with the audio data. The present inventionconfigures the physical characteristics of a disc by essentiallycreating a predetermined modulation used to bury one of theauthentication keys, which would not be transferred and which will notappear at the audio output. Thus, another disc having the samemodulation characteristics is required in order for it to be consideredan authenticated CD or data disc.

Accordingly, the present invention utilizes a process that createsvarious depths or widths, for example, of pits in a disc withinpredetermined tolerances to generate an authentication key or keys invalidating whether the disc (and/or data) is authentic and, therefore,proper to record thereon. Various standard processes may be used toimpregnate, implant, form or configure the disc to include thepredetermined pit depth, width or track modulation or variation with thedesired tolerances.

Another feature of the present invention is the combinative use of theabove three methods for either generating a security authentication keyhaving two or more components, or for accessing the key buried indifferent places on the disc. For example, a single authentication keymay comprise the combination of components generated by using the pitwidth, pit track and pit depth modulation methods.

Alternatively, one method, such as pit width modulation, may generate anauthentication key that indicates a random location on the disc where asecond authentication key or code is located, and so forth. That is, onemethod may be used as an address pointer, which may be programmed intothe table-of-contents area on a disc.

Yet another alternative involves using one method, such as pit widthmodulation, to generate an authentication key or code that validates asecond key/code, which can be generated using a different modulationmethod, such as pit track modulation. Additional keys and/or componentsmay also be generated or used.

To achieve these and other objects, the present invention provides acomputer program product that stores computer instructions thereon forinstructing a computer to perform a process of authenticating a datamedia, such as a CD or DVD, as fraudulent/pirated or non-fraudulent.

In accordance with one embodiment of the invention, a methodauthenticates at least one of a media and data stored on the media inorder to prevent at least one of piracy, unauthorized access andunauthorized copying of the data stored on the media. At least one pitdepth, pit width or pit track modulated data, derived from a physicalcharacteristic of a data disc, is introduced with the original dataresulting in mixed data. The mixed data is optionally stored on themedia. Each pit depth and/or pit width and/or pit track modulated dataincludes at least one authentication key or at least one component of anauthentication key, for authenticating whether the media and/or data isauthorized.

The method includes the following sequential, non-sequential and/orsequence independent steps: (a) reading mixed data from a media; (b)detecting at least one of pit depth, pit width and pit track modulateddata from the mixed data; (c) comparing each pit modulated data to atleast one authentication key or component thereof; (d) authenticating atleast one of the media and the pit modulated data in the mixed dataresponsive to the comparing (c) step; (e) removing pit modulated datafrom the mixed data via a decoding operation resulting in substantiallyunimpaired corrected data; and (f) outputting the unimpaired correcteddata as at least one of audio, video, audio data, video data and digitaldata substantially free of pit modulated data.

The method also includes the steps of: (g) physically altering at leastone of a pit depth, pit width and pit track of a data disc on at leastone of a per track basis and on an interval basis throughout the datadisc such that authentication is performed for at least one of eachtrack to be played, throughout playback and throughout recording; (h)using a process defined in at least one of the reading, detecting,comparing, authenticating, removing and outputting steps, as amulti-level authentication system containing at least two differentauthentication keys, each of which successively must be authenticatedbefore said unimpaired corrected data is finally output; and (i)performing the method of authenticating over a plurality ofinterconnected computer networks comprising at least one of a localnetwork, global network and Internet.

In accordance with another embodiment of the invention, a data playerincludes a data processor performing the steps of: (a) reading mixeddata from the media; (b) detecting at least one of pit depth, pit widthand pit track modulated data from the mixed data; and (c) comparing eachpit modulated data to at least one authentication key or componentthereof. The data player authenticates the media and/or the pit depth,pit width and/or pit track modulated data in the mixed data responsiveto the comparing, and removes the pit modulated data from the mixed dataresulting in substantially unimpaired corrected data. The data playeroutputs the data as at least one of audio, video, audio data, video dataand digital data substantially free of pit modulated data.

According to another embodiment of the invention, a data messagecomprises at least one authentication key formed by modulating at leastone of a disc pit, width and track on a basis of a physicalcharacteristic of said disc. The pit modulated data is combined with theoriginal data to form mixed data that is introduced into the datamessage. Each pit modulated data comprises at least one authenticationkey or component thereof used in authenticating whether the data messageis authorized. The pit depth, pit width or pit track modulated datacannot be readily altered, obscured or removed from the mixed datawithout simultaneously degrading or impairing a quality of an audiblecomponent of the data message. The data message is advantageouslytransmitted substantially free of each pit modulated data, preventing adestination processor from reading and subsequently authenticating thedata message.

According to another embodiment of the invention, a data disc comprisesat least one variation, based on a physical characteristic of the disc,in the disc's pit width, pit depth and/or pit track. The pit depth,width and/or track modulated data is introduced with original dataresulting into mixed data. The mixed data stored on the data disc. Eachpit modulated data, which comprises at least one authentication key orcomponent thereof, is used in authenticating whether at the media and/orpit modulated data is authorized.

A computer or processor driven system, tangible medium includinginstructions thereon, and process is also provided.

There has thus been outlined, rather broadly, the important features ofthe invention in order that the detailed description thereof thatfollows may be better understood, and in order that the presentcontribution to the art may be better appreciated. There are, of course,additional features of the invention that will be described hereinafterand which will perform the subject matter of the claims appended hereto.

In this respect, before explaining at least one embodiment of theinvention in detail, it is to be understood that the invention is notlimited in its application to the details of construction and to thearrangements of the components set forth in the following description orillustrated in the drawings. The invention is capable of otherembodiments and of being practiced and carried out in various ways.Also, it is to be understood that the phraseology and terminologyemployed herein are for the purposes of description and should not beregarded as limiting.

As such, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the conception,upon which this disclosure is based, may readily be used as a basis forthe designing of other structures, methods and systems for carrying outthe several purposes of the present invention. It is important,therefore, that the claims be regarded as including such equivalentconstructions insofar as they do not depart from the spirit and scope ofthe present invention.

Further, the purpose of the foregoing abstract is to enable the U. S.Patent and Trademark Office and the public, generally, and especiallyscientists, engineers and practitioners in the art, who are not familiarwith patent or legal terms or phraseology, to determine quickly from acursory inspection, the nature and essence of the technical disclosureof the application. The abstract is neither intended to define theinvention of the application, which is measured by the claims, nor is itintended to be limiting as to the scope of the invention in any way.

The above objects of the invention, together with other apparent objectsof the invention, along with the various features of novelty thatcharacterize the invention, are pointed out with particularity in theclaims annexed to and forming a part of this disclosure. For a betterunderstanding of the invention, its operating advantages and thespecific objects attained by its uses, reference should be had to theaccompanying drawings and descriptive matter, which illustrate preferredembodiments of the invention.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a conventional specification table for a conventionalcompact disc system.

FIG. 2 shows a scale drawing of a conventional CD data surface.

FIG. 3 shows a typical compact disc pit surface.

FIG. 4 shows a diagram of a conventional pit track.

FIG. 5 shows a conventional bump height on a CD surface.

FIG. 6 shows a block diagram of a conventional CD player showing audiopath as well as servo and control functions.

FIG. 7 shows an optical path of a conventional three-beam pickup system.

FIG. 8 shows the properties of astigmatism used to generate anauto-focus correction signal in a conventional three-beam pickup system.

FIG. 9 shows a conventional servo motor used to move the objective lensin an optical path.

FIG. 10 is an illustration of a spiral modulation configuration used inconjunction with the present invention.

FIG. 11 is a graph, illustrating in sinusoidal form, a pit depth, widthor track modulation within a predetermined tolerance.

FIG. 12 is a graph, illustrating in step-wise form, a pit depth, widthor track modulation within a predetermined tolerance.

FIG. 13 is a block diagram for a portion of a disk reader according toone embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 14 is an illustration of the spectral content of a frequency.

FIG. 15 is a graph of a standard output voltage.

FIG. 16 is a graph of several modulated pit width output voltages.

FIG. 17 is a graph of a digitized modulated output voltage.

FIG. 18 shows a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of a CD to be played on a CD player.

FIGS. 19-22 show a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of a CD to be copied by a CD recorder.

FIG. 23 is an illustration of a main central processing unit forimplementing the computer processing in accordance with a computerimplemented embodiment of the present invention, when the data playerand/or recorder is part of a personal computing system.

FIG. 24 illustrates a block diagram of the internal hardware of thecomputer of FIG. 23.

FIG. 25 is a block diagram of the internal hardware of the computer ofFIG. 23 in accordance with a second embodiment.

FIG. 26 is an illustration of an exemplary memory medium that can beused with disc drives illustrated in FIGS. 23-25.

FIG. 27 shows a plurality of disc player, disc recorders andworkstations connected to a global network, such as the Internet.

FIG. 28 shows a block diagram of the process by which pit depth, widthand track modulation data are transmitted in an electronic audio/videodata file, and are used as a key or keys for authenticating the efile.

FIG. 29 shows a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of an electronic audio/video data file retrievedvia the Internet for playing.

FIG. 30 shows a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of an electronic audio/video data file retrievedvia the Internet for copying.

FIG. 31 is an illustration of the architecture of the combined Internet,POTS, and ADSL architecture for use in the present invention inaccordance with another design or embodiment.

The same reference numerals refer to the same parts throughout thevarious Figures.

NOTATIONS AND NOMENCLATURES

The detailed description that follows may be presented in terms ofprogram procedures executed on a computer or network of computers. Theseprocedural descriptions and representations are the means used by thoseskilled.in the art to most effectively convey the substance of theirwork to others skilled in the art.

A procedure is here, and generally, conceived to be a self-consistentsequence of steps leading to a desired result. These steps are thoserequiring physical manipulations of physical quantities. Usually, thoughnot necessarily, these quantities take the form of electrical ormagnetic signals capable of being stored, transferred, combined,compared and otherwise manipulated. It proves convenient at times,principally for reasons of common usage, to refer to these signals asbits, values, elements, symbols, characters, terms, numbers, or thelike. It should be noted, however, that all of these and similar termsare to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and aremerely convenient labels applied to these quantities.

Further, the manipulations performed are often referred to in terms,such as adding or comparing, which are commonly associated with mentaloperations performed by a human operator. No such capability of a humanoperator is necessary, or desirable in most cases, in any of theoperations described herein which form part of the present invention;the operations are machine operations. Useful machines for performingthe operation of the present invention include general purpose digitalcomputers or similar devices.

The present invention also relates to an apparatus for performing theseoperations. This apparatus may be specially constructed for the requiredpurpose or it may comprise a general purpose computer as selectivelyactivated or reconfigured by a computer program stored in a computer.The procedures presented herein are not inherently related to aparticular computer or other apparatus. Various general purpose machinesmay be used with programs written in accordance with the teachingsherein, or it may prove more convenient to construct more specializedapparatus to perform the required method steps. The required structurefor a variety of these machines will appear from the description given.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

The present invention relates to a method and system of preventingunauthorized copying of data on data media, including CDs and DVDs.Generally, an authorized CD is designed to require decoding by anauthorized disc player. The authorized CD includes certain informationused by an authorized CD player for playing music. An unauthorizedcopied, formed or pressed CD, however, does not have the requisiteencryption or decryption key(s) necessary for decoding.

Consequently, a feature and advantage of the present invention is toprevent piracy of audio and/or video data from data discs; that is, toprovide greatly enhanced security measures against data disc pirating.

The present invention is based, in part, on my discovery that theauthentication key(s) need not necessarily be transferred in theaudio/video using conventional hardware and/or software in, for example,CD or DVD players that may be adapted in one or more ways describedbelow.

In the present invention, physical marking of the data media ismanifested in three different methods; namely, via pit width modulation,pit depth modulation, and pit track modulation. Each physical markrepresents zeros and ones forming part of an authentication key or keys.Singular or multi-level authentication systems may be used forpreventing unauthorized copying of audio data or other data on a disc.Similarly, two or three different authentication systems, each of whichsuccessively must be deciphered before the audio/video is finallyavailable, may also be used.

Advantageously, the present invention optionally uses three or fourdifferent sources for making or compiling a long or compoundauthentication keys. Thus, in other words, instead of, or in additionto, having a multi-layered decryption or authentication system, thepresent invention optionally includes a multi-level authentication key,each component of which must be found in order to build the whole key toperform the entire decryption or authentication process.

According to the present invention, there are three ways thatauthentication keys can be formed and remain hidden. Each method ofproducing authentication keys is a function of the physicalcharacteristics of a disc that does not normally travel with the audioor video or graphics,data.

Accordingly, the first method is pit width modulation, which requires,in the normal layers of a disc, a variation in the width of a pit. Thesecond method is pit depth modulation, in which pit depth could bevaried in a predetermined manner within normal manufacturing tolerances.As in the first method, modulated voltage based on the pit's depth isused to. derive an authentication key or keys. The third method is pittrack modulation in which the smooth, continuous spiral/track ismodulated on very small levels.

A further advantage of the present invention is that pit width, depthand track modulations are formed on a per track basis or at intervalsthroughout the disc. This means that the same type of authenticationprocess may be performed for each track to be played, or may beperformed throughout the playing/recording process. Thus, it isimportant to note that each track of a CD or DVD can optionally includea different authentication key.

Referring to FIG. 10, the CD, DVD or other data disc is modulated with apredetermined groove configuration, such as a spiral groove, to form apit modulation.

Pit Depth Modulation

FIG. 11 is a graph, illustrating in sinusoidal form, a pit modulationwithin a predetermined tolerance, such as within standard discmanufacturing tolerances. The graph shows the overall sinusoidal shapeof actual voltages, within designated tolerances, during one rotation ofa CD as a result of the pit depth modulation. (Similar results apply topit width and/or pit track modulation.)

FIG. 12 is also a graphic illustration of the voltages curve for a pitmodulation, but of a different shape. Here, the graph shows thestep-wise shape of actual voltages of the modulation, whether pit depth,pit width or spiral shaped, within predetermined tolerances such thatthe audio or video generated therefrom is not distorted.

Depending on the type of modulation employed (i.e. pit width, pit depthor pit track), a disc reader must be correspondingly modified in orderto detect the modulation. FIG. 13 is a block diagram of a modified discreader of the present invention. The modified disc reader 1 includesfirst, second, third and fourth detectors 6, 14, 18, 20. The firstdetector is a standard detector 6, which detects data stream based onthe modulation. That data stream, representing audio or video data, isoutput as normal.

Detector 6 detects a typical audio information reflected in the laserbeam from disc 2 via a standard reflection mirror 4. A standard laser 10emits a laser beam through lens 8 and mirror 4 for reading data on theCD 2. Focus server 12 focuses the laser beam on the disc 2.

Additionally, focus server 12 focuses the laser 10 to modulate the pitdepth. The second detector 14 detects an additional voltage derived fromthe focus server 12. Detector 14 is used to monitor and determine thedifferent depths of the disc 2 to detect variations and theauthentication keys deriving therefrom. Other standard components of thedisc reader 1 are not illustrated.

The physical configuration of disc 2, based on generally slightvariations in a pit's depth, width and/or track, produces a modulatedauthentication key. The physical configuration that produces thismodulated key is formed in the disc 2 in any suitable area. A suitablearea may be an area of disc 2 that does not have audio data, such as asilent area, or in the initial start-up area of disc 2.

Another suitable area can include the table-of-contents (TOC) area ofthe disc. This key could be used to not only prevent playback of thecontents of the disc, but at the same time prevent recording onto theCD, when such recording equipment becomes available.

Alternatively, the physical configuration may be modulated between, forexample, songs or programs. A further alternative is to have themodulation occur within, for example, a song, where the modulation isconfigured to track closely or substantially correspond to the data onthe disc, resulting in very difficult to detect modulation.

To create this disc, the focus is modulated of the server cutting theglass, which is used to make the mold to actually press a disc.duringthe manufacturing process. Accordingly, the pit depths may be a functionof the data themselves as a physical characteristic of the disc. Thus, awhole stack of authorized compact discs that have their pit depthalready modulated with a particular company's specifications, areequipped to provide an indication of authorization of the data disc.

Data on a disc typically comprises pits and reflective land surfaces ofdifferent lengths and durations, which represent symbols representativeof data on the disc. Each pit and land is cut in a photoresist materialon the glass of a disc. A chemical solution, such as a gas or etchingsolution, is used to etch the glass to produce varying depths. Depthvariation of the pits is configured within normal or standard tolerancelimits, such as ±10-15 percent. These varying depths are sufficient toextract appropriate signals from a focus server 12.

Since the server is inside a CD or DVD player, focus server 12 is asecure device. In addition, the modulated information is not availablenor is transmitted in audio form, to the recording player.

To accomplish extra pit depth in designated areas of a disc, severalalternatives are available. For example, more chemical or etchingsolution can be applied to the disc's surface. Or, the etching solutionapplied thereon may be allowed to sit for a longer period of time.Alternatively, a double photoresist material may be used.

A fourth alternative is to use an incompletely developed photoresistmaterial after exposure. The logical sequence of events begins withexposure of the photoresist material by an intense laser beam. A fullyexposed photoresist material results in variation of the hydrofluoricacid's activity rate, even if the glass walls have been cured. Thisvariation means that the hydrochloric acid is ineffective insubstantially or totally developing the photoresist material.Consequently, incomplete development of the photoresist material resultsat deeper parts of the disc.

A fifth alternative that facilitates uneven disc pit depth formationwithin predetermined tolerances, includes using a specialized additionalphotoresist material that is uneven or non-uniform; namely, aphotoresist material that is uneven or non-uniform in a predeterminedmanner that corresponds to the predetermined or desired key to beembedded therein or formed thereby.

Moreover, configuring a standard photoresist layer to include an extraarea for forming a predetermined key or data, as described in thepreceding paragraph above, is yet another method for creating uneven pitdepths in a disc. Accordingly, instead of having a uniform photoresistmaterial, the photoresist material may be a little thinner in someplaces and a little thicker in other places. As a result, afterimmersion of the photoresist material in a chemical solution, avariation in the disc's pit depth occurs, because the photoresistmaterial would provide different effects when a laser beam subsequentlyhits the disc's surface.

Advantageously, the present invention encompasses a process that createsvariation in disc pit depths within normal predetermined manufacturingtolerances, to generate a code or authentication key or componentthereof, used in validating whether a disc is authentic and, therefore,proper to record thereon or play the data contained therein. Variousalternatives may be used to implant, impregnate, form or configure thedisc to include the predetermined pit depth modulation or variation withdesired tolerances. The above-mentioned alternatives for forming varyingpit depths are merely exemplary. Any other method may also be used toaccomplish this task.

Pit Track Modulation

Another method of varying the physical characteristics of a disc is tovary track portions. This is accomplished by using a laser beam recorderat relatively low frequencies during the making of designated tracks ina disc. The term ‘low frequencies’ is meant to refer to a frequencylower than the frequency normally used for the symbol or actual pitgrade containing the data on the disc.

For instance, a grouping of pits, say 100, in a track may be modulatedin such a way that the grouping is shifted, within predeterminedtolerance ranges, to the left of actual data for those 100 pits. Or, thegrouping may be modulated or shifted to the right for a different numberof pits, depending on the desired intended sending signal. Thus, what ismeant by low frequency really refers to a low frequency relative to theactual pits on a disc.

One or more of these different track modulations that are optionallydispersed throughout a disc are used to generate a binary security keythereby. This process of generating a security authentication keyaccording to track modulation is optionally independent of all theactual disc data, which may be encrypted or in plain text.

Referring again to FIG. 13, a standard tracking server 16 is used totrack pit track modulation. The disc reader 1 is modified to include athird detector 18 that is used to detect track-specific voltagedifferences for generating the authentication key that results from thetrack modulation. Alternatively, detectors 6, 14 may be used to detectvoltage differences.

Tracking server 16 will produce a low voltage output as the laser beamis radiated onto the disc when server 16 follows the modulation in eachtrack. It will also output voltage that would normally be linear. But,in the present invention, there will be additional modulation to form akey.

The interesting feature about the pit track modulation method, like thepit width modulation method, is that this technique will not produce asecurity authentication key in the audio output. In addition, the pittrack modulation created via the tracking server can operate independentof, or in addition to, pit depth modulation via its focus server.

Generally, as well as in low frequency situations, the main task oftracking server 16 is to follow the eccentricities of each disc as thedisc rotates, essentially keeping the laser on the appropriate track.Tracking server 16 continuously produces outputs in order to make surethat the laser beam is directed to the disc's surface and does not jumpa track, similar to the task of pickup needles on a standard LP. Theseoutputs take the form of a background sinusoidal variation of voltage ata rate proportional to one complete rotational cycle. See e.g. FIG. 11.

The low frequency data is equal to approximately 100 bits of disc data.In addition, the sinusoidal wave is optionally modulated relative to thedisc's rotation at a much higher frequency. The high frequency modulatedwave is practically noise-free, because there is no high disc frequencyavailable with which to modulate the track at that rate. Thus, thevoltage produced by tracking server 16 would normally look like thesinusoidal wave illustrated in FIG. 11.

Moreover, after high-pass filtering, the sinusoidal wave is transformedinto the modulation illustrated in FIG. 12. In the frequency domain, thespectral content of the frequency is represented as shown in FIG. 14.

As discussed, the idea is that this track modulated data may be used asan authentication key or as a component or portion of the key. Inaddition, the above described modulating method advantageously includeserror correction.

In conclusion, a potential thief would have to interfere with the laserto attempt to match the track modulation. The pit track modulationmethod, like the other two methods, raises the level of sophisticationfor a thief.

The present invention also provides the ability to encrypt the datamodulated on the disc. Further, the present invention optionally andadvantageously compares the modulated signal to a table of validmodulated signals.

Pit Width Modulation

The third method of varying the physical characteristics of a disc isthe pit width modulation method. Because pits and reflective landsurfaces have varying lengths, a standard output voltage curve will looklike the ones depicted in FIG. 15. When pit widths are modulated,voltages appear as illustrated in FIG. 16, where wider pits result involtages that rise above normal levels. These voltages are the output ofa fourth detector 20 detecting the beam emitting from laser 10.

So, when light from laser 10 radiates on a pit, a voltage is produced,which voltage is detected by detector 20. The laser light is thenmodulated with respect to a standard pit. Extra pit width (and extra pitdepth) variation will produce varying voltages, as illustrated in FIGS.16 and 17.

Detector 20 may then be used to detect the pit width modulation todetermine the authentication key, keys and/or components of keys to beused in the present invention as described herein. Thus, card reader 1is modified to detect the pits that are width modulated, via detector20, and will thereby detect an additional voltage produced to determinea key. Thus, detector 20, as described above, determines authenticationkey data that is being modulated via pit width modulation.

Again, voltage changes due to pit width variation are not transferred inthe audio output signal, because error correction will correct theaudio, which might include some of the changes. Thus, voltage changesdissipate as soon as the standard error correction mechanism is used tocorrect for the modulation. In addition, the standard digital outputwill be zeros and ones that would remove any voltage changes/variations,and transmit the data as a nicely squared signal.

It is important to note that error correction is always at work in thepresent invention. See FIG. 13. Information read from a CD will requireerror correction because of normal day-to-day irregularities such asfingerprints, coffee stains, etc. Therefore, a variation in the laserbeam output from detector 6, in FIG. 13, is likely.

Error correction essentially ensures that a signal produced by trackingserver 16 or detectors 14, 18, 20 will be a valid signal. Errorcorrection also ensures the possibility of being able to expectadditional detector 14 or tracking server 16 to have a signal of aparticular magnitude to compare to a look-up table. (Note that in anycase, focus and tracking servers 12, 16, function to eliminateirregularities like a fingerprint, which accidentally diverts servers12, 16.) The second detector 14 extracts the modulation from focusserver 12, which operates in a closed loop, for example, with lens 8.Thus, the present invention is taking off that voltage, doing somefiltering, slicing and then extracting the data.

To summarize, the first, second, third and fourth detectors 6, 14, 18,20, (e.g., first, second, third and fourth detecting devices) detectsall modulation produced from each of the pit width, pit depth and pittrack modulation methods.

The fourth detector 20 is used to detect the pit width modulation todetermine the decryption key(s) and/or components of key(s) to be usedin the present invention as described herein. It detects the pits thatare width modulated, and will thereby detect an additional voltageproduced to determine the key. In other words, detector 20 determinesthe authenticating key data that has been modulated via pit widthmodulation.

The third detector 18 is used to detect the pit track modulation. Itdetects the pits that are track modulated, and will detect an additionalvoltage produced to determine an authentication key. Thus, detector 18determines authentication key data that has been modulated via pit trackmodulation.

The second detector 14, also a focus detector, is used to detect the pitdepth modulation to determine authentication key(s) and/or components ofkey(s) to be used in the present invention as described herein. Itdetects the pits that are depth modulated, and will detect an additionalvoltage produced to determine the key. In other words, focus detector 14determines the authentication key data that has been modulated via pitdepth modulation.

Pit width modulation data may also be used, as described above, incombination with one or more of the above methods, to perform animportant function; namely, to verify a data stream that has beenmodulated on the disc, and then used to determine the relevance and/orvalidity of other modulated data hidden or formed within the physicalcharacteristics of the data disc.

The main reason for providing one or more of the above-mentionedmodulation techniques that are based on the physical characteristics ofthe disc, is to produce another obstacle to a potential pirate who mightbe starting from scratch by cutting his own disc. Again, the mainpurpose of having a physical key of one or more of these types is thatthe keys represent ‘lost keys’ that do not appear in the output data.Moreover, it principally overcomes the possibility of making a directdata transfer from one disc to another.

In other words, all three modulation methods could be used to derivephysical keys on a CD, so that if one key is unlocked, progression ontothe next key is permitted, etc. One would not have to use these threemethods necessarily. One could use one method, or any of the threemethods or variations.

Conceptually, the present invention provides the ability to not onlyhave authentication keys on a track-by-track basis, but also multiplecomponent keys that need to be combined, multiple keys, and the like,for validation and for purposes of playing a disc.

An alternative embodiment of the present invention employs the use of aaddress pointer, which instructs a player's server to go to a designateddisc location containing the decryption key(s), and read that location.There are many variations on the theme on what this data represents. Butthe main theme is that it is a key, or part of a key, of severaldifferent security authentication methods, or a part of a key of oneencryption/decryption method.

Again, these physical keys are generally hidden keys. The keys arehidden in the sense that all are lost and not included in the audiooutput. In addition, standard error correction is also provided, becausethe actual modulation obtained from detectors will contain naturalerrors that occur on a disc. All three methods described herein arebasically modulation methods where physical hidden characteristics, orhidden data, or embedded signaling information exists. That informationis going to be a part of, or separate keys, to decrypt the audio data.

FIG. 18 shows a flow chart of the decision logic describing operation ofa disc player when attempting to play a CD in accordance with oneembodiment of the invention. For simplicity, the following steps areidentified in the drawings by the letter “S” preceding the referencenumeral; that is, Step 22 is shown in the drawings as “S22”, etc.

The process begins at Step 22 when CD 2 is inserted into a CD player.The player begins reading the CD 2, (Step 24), by detecting bits fromthe disc's surface (Step 26). Once the data is recovered, the data ismodulated using, for example, eight-to-fourteen modulation (Step 28).The demodulated data is sent to a buffer (Step 30).

At Step 32, (S32), the player's circuitry or processes must determinewhether the data on disc 2 is pit depth, pit width and/or pit trackmodulated. If no pit modulated data is read, the disc is determined tobe fraudulent (Step 34), and the disc player ends playback activity(Step 36). On the other hand, if it is found that the disc 2 containspit depth, width and/or track modulated data, the next Step 38 is toread that data and determine authentication key(s) or componentsthereof, an operation performed by an authentication algorithm locatedwithin an authentication module (as at FIG. 28).

Once each authentication key is read into the authentication algorithm,(Step 40), it is then determined whether each authentication key iscorrect (Step 42). The authentication algorithm in a CD player (notshown) will have a component corresponding to the authentication key(s)on disc 2. If comparison of the component with the key(s) does notmatch, CD 2 is determined to be fraudulent (Step 44) and playbackactivity ends (Step 46).

If, on the other hand, it is determined that the component correctlymatches the authentication key(s), the player's circuity is triggered tobegin the error removal process (Step 48) in which errors are removed,data is filtered (Step 50) and ultimately converted to sensible audibleoutput data (Steps 52, 54). While the above description focuses on aparticular sequence of process steps, the present invention mayalternatively be used via a different sequence of the above describedsteps.

FIG. 19 illustrates a flow chart of the decision logic describingoperations when a first CD plays the data to be recorded by a second CD.For simplicity, the CD player will be referenced as player #1, and theCD recorder will be referenced as recorder #2. Also, the first CD playedby player #1 will be referenced as CD #1, and the second CD recorded byrecorder #2 will be referenced as CD #2.

At inception, (Step 60 or S60), CD player #1 is connected to the outputport of recorder #2, or other standard means for capturing the output ofplayer #1. Playback begins when CD #1 is inserted into player #1 (Step62). Recording begins when CD #2 is inserted into recorder #2 (Step 64).The next step in CD player #1 is the reading of CD #1, (Step 66), bydetecting bits contained on the surface of CD #1 (Step 68).

Once the data is recovered, the data is demodulated using, for example,eight-to-fourteen modulation or other standard modulation (Step 70). Thedemodulated data is transferred and stored in a buffer, (Step 72).

At Step 74 (S74) depicted in FIG. 19, the player's circuitry mustdetermine whether the data on CD #1 contains pit depth, width and/ortrack modulation. If not, the disc is determined to be fraudulent (Step76), and player #1 ends playback activity (Step 78). See FIG. 20.

On the other hand, if it is found that the CD #1 contains predeterminederrors, the next Step 80 (S80) in FIG. 21 is to read the modulated dataand determine authentication key(s) and/or components thereof. Anystandard authentication algorithm may be used, such as data encryptionstandard (DES) and the like, located within the authentication module ofCD player #1. See FIG. 21.

Once the authentication key(s) is/are read into the authenticationalgorithm, (Step 82), in a standard manner, and it is then determinedwhether the authentication key(s) and/or components thereof is/arecorrect (Step 84). The authentication algorithm in CD player #1 willhave a component corresponding to the authentication key(s) on CD #1. Ifcomparison of the component with the key(s) does not match, CD #1 isdetermined to be fraudulent (Step 86), and playback activity ends (Step88).

If, on the other hand, it is determined in S84 that the componentcorrectly matches the authentication key(s), the player's circuitry istriggered to begin the error removal process, (Step 90), in which errorsare removed, and the data is filtered (Step 92) and ultimately convertedto sensible audible output data (Step 94).

Referring to FIG. 22, at this juncture, the authentication process forplaying the CD is completed, and recorder #2 receives the audio datafrom CD #1 (Step 96). This data is free of pit modulated data and allauthentication keys. Upon receipt, CD recorder #2 records the data ontoCD #2, a copy (Step 98). If CD #2 is later inserted into a CD player ofthe present invention, (e.g., a modified-CD player equipped with amodified disc reader to detect pit depth, width and track modulations),it will be determined to be a fraudulent CD pursuant to theabove-mentioned process of FIG. 13, because CD #2 does not contain therequisite pit depth, width and/or track modulations for authentication,since these modulations were not transferred in the data, such as audiodata (Step 100).

FIG. 23 is an illustration of a main central processing unit forimplementing the computer processing in accordance with a computerimplemented embodiment of the present invention, when the data playerand/or recorder is part of a personal computing system. The proceduresdescribed above may be presented in terms of program procedures executedon, for example, a computer or network of computers.

Viewed externally in FIG. 23, a computer system designated by referencenumeral 140 has a central processing unit 142 having disc drives 144 and146. Disc drive indications 144, 146 are merely symbolic of a number ofdisc drives that might be accommodated by the computer system. Typicallythese would include a floppy disc drive such as 144, a hard disc drive(not shown externally) and a CD ROM indicated by slot 146. The numberand type of drives varies, typically with different computerconfigurations. Disc drives 144, 146 are in fact optional, and for spaceconsiderations, may be easily omitted from the computer system used inconjunction with the production process/apparatus described herein.

The computer also has an optional display 148 upon which information isdisplayed. In some situations, a keyboard 150 and a mouse 152 may beprovided as input devices to interface with the central processing unit142. Then again, for enhanced portability, the keyboard 150 may beeither a limited function keyboard or omitted in its entirety. Inaddition, mouse 152 may be a touch pad control device, or a track balldevice, or even omitted in its entirety as well. In addition, thecomputer system also optionally includes at least one infraredtransmitter 176 and/or infrared receiver 178 for either transmittingand/or receiving infrared signals, as described below.

FIG. 24 illustrates a block diagram of the internal hardware of thecomputer of FIG. 23. A bus 156 serves as the main information highwayinter-connecting the other components of the computer. CPU 158 is thecentral processing unit of the system, performing calculations and logicoperations required to execute a program. Read only memory (ROM) 160 andrandom access memory (RAM) 162 constitute the main memory of thecomputer. Disc controller 164 interfaces one or more disc drives to thesystem bus 156. These disc drives may be floppy disc drives such as 170,or CD ROM or DVD (digital video disc) drives such as 166, or internal orexternal hard drives 168. As indicated previously, these various discdrives and disc controllers are optional devices.

A display interface 172 interfaces display 148 and permits informationfrom the bus 156 to be displayed on the display 148. Again as indicated,display 148 is also an optional accessory. For example, display 148could be substituted or omitted. Communication with external devices,for example, the components of the apparatus described herein, occursusing communications port 174. For example, optical fibers and/orelectrical cables and/or conductors and/or optical communication (e.g.,infrared and the like) and/or wireless communication (e.g., radiofrequency (RF) and the like) can be used as the transport medium betweenthe external devices and communication port 174.

In addition to the standard components of the computer the computer alsooptionally includes at least one of infrared transmitter 176 or infraredreceiver 178. Infrared transmitter 176 is used when the computer systemis used in conjunction with one or more of the processingcomponents/stations that transmits/receives data via infrared signaltransmission.

FIG. 25 is a block diagram of the internal hardware of the computer ofFIG. 23 in accordance with a second embodiment. In FIG. 25, instead ofutilizing an infrared transmitter or infrared receiver, the computersystem uses at least one of a low power radio transmitter 180 and/or alow power radio receiver 182. The low power radio transmitter 180transmits the signal for reception by components of the productionprocess, and receives signals from the components via the low powerradio receiver 182. The lower power radio transmitter and/or receiver180, 182 are standard devices in industry.

FIG. 26 is an illustration of an exemplary memory medium which can beused with disc drives illustrated in FIGS. 23-25. Typically, memorymedia such as floppy discs, or a CD ROM, or a digital video disc willcontain, for example, a multi-byte locale for a single byte language andthe program information for controlling the computer to enable thecomputer to perform the functions described herein. Alternatively, ROM160 and/or RAM 162 illustrated in FIGS. 24-25 can also be used to storethe program information that is used to instruct the central processingunit 158 to perform the operations associated with the productionprocess.

Although processing system 140 is illustrated having a single processor,a single hard disc drive and a single local memory, processing system140 may suitably be equipped with any multitude or combination ofprocessors or storage devices. Processing system 140 may, in point offact, be replaced by, or combined with, any suitable processing systemoperative in accordance with the principles of the present invention,including sophisticated calculators (and hand-held), laptop/notebook,mini, mainframe and super computers, as well as processing systemnetwork combinations of the same.

Conventional processing system architecture is more fully discussed inComputer Organization and Architecture, by Williams Stallings, McMillanPublishing Co. (3rd ed. 1993); conventional processing system networkdesign is more fully discussed in Data Network Design, by Darren L.Spohn, McGraw-Hill, Inc. (1993), and conventional data communications ismore fully discussed in Data Communications Principles, by R. D. Gitlin,J. F. Hayes and S. B. Weinstein, Plenum Press (1992) and The IrwinHandbook of Telecomunications, by James Harry Green, Irwin ProfessionalPublishing (2nd ed. 1992). Each of the foregoing publications isincorporated herein by reference.

Alternatively, the hardware configuration may be arranged according tothe multiple instruction multiple data (MIMD) multiprocessor format foradditional computing efficiency. The details of this form of computerarchitecture are disclosed in greater detail in, for example, U.S. Pat.No. 5,163,131; Boxer, A., “Where Buses Cannot Go”, IEEE SPECTRUM,February 1995, pp. 41-45; and Barroso, L. A. et al., “RPM: A RapidPrototyping Engine for Multiprocessor Systems”, IEEE COMPUTER, February1995, pp. 26-34, all of which are incorporated herein by reference.

In alternate preferred embodiments, the above-identified processor, andin particular microprocessing circuit 158, may be replaced by orcombined with any other suitable processing circuits, includingprogrammable logic devices, such as PALs (programmable array logic) andPLAs (programmable logic arrays), DSPs (digital signal processors),FPGAs (field programmable gate arrays), ASICs (application specificintegrated circuits), VLSIs (very large scale integrated circuits) orthe like.

FIG. 27 shows a plurality of disc players and disc recorders 186, 188,190, 192, 194, 196 and work stations 198, 200, 202 connected to a globalnetwork, such as the Internet 220, via an Internet Service Provider 204,in accordance with one embodiment. The above system also accommodatesInternet access to electronic audio/video data files through homeelectronic equipment, such as television/stereos 206 and cable/modem208. Thus, data may emanate from, or be transmitted to, any one of thesestations or devices.

FIGS. 28-29 shows the authentication process as it applies toInternet-related playing and copying. For instance, FIG. 28 shows ablock diagram of the process by which pit depth, pit width and/or pittrack modulations are stored in an electronic file, and are used as anauthentication key or keys for authenticating the existence of anon-pirated efile. The process begins with a data media, which may be adisc, a computer or network of computers, such as the Internet, capableof storing data.

In this embodiment, the data is an electronic video or audio data file(“efile”) 210 into which pit depth, pit width and/or pit trackmodulations are reproduced. These modulations are mixed and edited withthe original video or audio data and stored in the efile.

The resulting data (“efile data”) 212 containing the modulations istransmitted into an authentication module 216 when efile 210 isrequested by a user over the Internet. Authentication module 216 isdisposed, for example, at the ISP's web site 214, which uses the pitmodulated data in efile data 212 as keys or components thereof, forauthenticating whether efile 210 is a non-pirated file. Once efile 210is authenticated, authentication module 216 transfers data 212 to adecoder web crawler 218, which intakes the data, manipulates it,performs error correction and outputs corrected data 219. The newcorrected data 219 is free of pit modulated data and authenticationkeys, and contains the original (audio and/or video) data only.

The above description is one example of the architecture used toimplement the present invention, and other architectures may also beused. For example, the ISP website and/or server need not physicallyhouse or contain the authentication or decoder modules, but one or bothof these devices may be disposed remote to the ISP website and/orserver.

FIG. 29 illustrates a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of an electronic audio/video data file retrievedvia the Internet for playing. The process begins at Step 102 (S102) whena user accesses music and/or video file(s) on the Internet via an ISP'sweb site 214. The ISP's decoder web crawler 218 begins reading the efile210, (Step 104), looking for pit depth, pit depth and/or pit trackmodulated data (Step 106). If no modulated data is found, efile 210 isdetermined to be fraudulent, (Step 108), and efile 210 is nottransmitted to the user (Step 110). Thus, unauthorized access isprevented.

On the other hand, if it is found that efile 210 contains modulateddata, the next Step 112 is to read those data and determine theauthentication key(s), an operation performed by an authenticationalgorithm located within authentication module 216.

Once the authentication key(s) or components thereof is/are read intothe authentication algorithm, (Step 114), it is then determined whetherthe authentication key(s) is/are correct (Step 116). The authenticationalgorithm at the ISP's web site 214 will have a component correspondingto the authentication key(s) in efile 210. If comparison of thecomponent with the key(s) does not match, efile 210 is determined to befraudulent (Step 118), and efile 210 is not transmitted to the user(Step 120).

If, on the other hand, it is determined that the component correctly orsubstantially matches the authentication key(s), error correctionoccurs, (Step 122), the modulated data is filtered, data is converted tosensible audio and/or video output data, and ultimately transmitted tothe user (Step 124).

FIG. 30 illustrates a flow chart of the decision logic describing theauthentication process of an electronic audio/video data file retrievedvia the Internet for copying. The process begins at Step 126 (S126) whena user accesses music and/or file(s) on the Internet via an ISP's website 214. The ISP's decoder web crawler 218 begins the efile 210 (Step128) looking for pit depth, pit width and/or pit track modulated data(Step 130). If no modulations are found, efile 210 is determined to befraudulent (Step 132), and efile 210 is not transmitted to the user(Step 134). Thus, unauthorized access is prevented.

On the other hand, if it is found that efile 210 contains modulateddata, the next Step 136 is to read that data and determine theauthentication key(s), an operation performed by an authenticationalgorithm located within authentication module 216.

Once the authentication key or keys are read into the authenticationalgorithm (Step 138), it is then determined whether each authenticationkey is correct (Step 140). The authentication algorithm at the ISP's website 214 will have a component corresponding to the authenticationkey(s) in efile 210. If comparison of the component with the key(s) orcomponents thereof does not match or substantially match, efile 210 isdetermined to be fraudulent (Step 142), and efile 210 is not transmittedto the user (Step 144).

If, on the other hand, it is determined that the component correctlymatches the authentication key(s), error correction occurs (Step 146),errors are removed, modulated data is filtered, data is converted tosensible audio and/or video output data, and ultimately transmitted tothe user (Step 148). The user's computer receives an efile 210 free oferrors and authentication key(s) (Step 150), at which point a user mayrecord the efile 120 (Step 152). This efile 210 is considered fraudulentfor purposes of future Internet use (S154), pursuant to the processoutlined in FIG. 29, because it does not contain the requisite pitdepth, pit width and/or pit track modulated data for subsequentauthentication.

FIG. 31 is an illustration of the architecture of the combined Internet,POTS, and ADSL architecture for use in the present invention inaccordance with another embodiment. In FIG. 31, to preserve POTS and toprevent a fault in the ADSL equipment 254, 256 from compromising analogvoice traffic 226, 296 the voice part of the spectrum (the lowest 4 kHz)is optionally separated from the rest by a passive filter, called a POTSsplitter 258, 260. The rest of the available bandwidth (from about 10kHz to 1 MHZ) carries data at rates up to 6 bits per second for everyhertz of bandwidth from data equipment 262, 264, 294. The ADSL equipment256 then has access to a number of destinations including significantlythe Internet 268, and other destinations 270, 272.

To exploit the higher frequencies, ADLS makes use of advanced modulationtechniques, of which the best known is the discrete multitone technology(DST). As its name implies, ADSL transmits data asymmetrically atdifferent rates upstream toward the central office 252 and downstreamtoward the subscriber 250.

Cable television providers are providing analogous Internet service toPC users over their TV cable systems by means of special cable modems.Such modems are capable of transmitting up to 30 Mb/s over hybridfiber/coax systems, which use fiber to bring signals to a neighborhoodand coax to distribute it to individual subscribers.

Cable modems come in many forms. Most create a downstream data streamout of one of the 6-MHZ television channels that occupy spectrum above50 MHZ (and more likely 550 MHz) and carve an upstream channel out ofthe 5-50 MHZ band, which is currently unused. Using 64-state quadratureamplitude modulation (64 QAM), a downstream channel can realisticallytransmit about 30 Mb/s (the oft-quoted lower speed of 10 Mb/s refers toPC rates associated with Ethernet connections). Upstream rates differconsiderably from vendor to vendor, but good hybrid fiber/coax systemscan deliver upstream speeds of a few megabits per second. Thus, likeADSL, cable modems transmit much more information downstream thanupstream.

The Internet architecture 220 and ADSL architecture 254, 256 may also becombined with, for example, user networks 222, 224, 228. As illustratedin this embodiment, users may access or use or participate in theadministration, or management computer assisted program in computer 240via various different access methods. In this embodiment, the variousdatabases 285, 286, 287 and/or 288, which may be used to store content,data and the like, are accessible via access to and/or by computersystem 240, and/or via Internet/local area network 220.

The above embodiments are only to be construed as examples of thevarious different types of computer systems that may be utilized inconnection with the computer-assisted and/or -implement process of thepresent invention. Further, while the above description has focused onintroducing pit depth, width and/or track modulated data into a specificmedia, such as a CD, the present invention may also be used to introducesuch modulated data to a digital bit stream that is in the process ofbeing transmitted from an originating area or device to a destinationdevice.

That is, the authentication process of the present invention may be usedto authenticate a data stream or collection of data, as opposed to, orin addition to, authenticating a specific media that has been used toplay the data. In addition, various standard matching algorithms may beused to determine whether the generated authentication key(s) orcomponents thereof match or substantially match for authenticationpurposes.

The many features and advantages of the invention are apparent from thedetailed specification. Thus, it is intended by the appended claims tocover all such features and advantages of the invention that fall withinthe true spirit and scope of the invention.

Further, since numerous modifications and variations will readily occurto those skilled in the art, it is not desired to limit the invention tothe exact construction illustrated and described. Accordingly, allsuitable modifications and equivalents may be resorted to, fallingwithin the scope of the invention.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for authenticating at least one of amedia and data stored on said media, in order to prevent at least one ofpiracy, unauthorized access and unauthorized copying of the data storedon said media, wherein said media is modulated via at least one of pitdepth, pit width and pit track comprising at least one authenticationkey or component thereof for authenticating whether at least one of saidmedia and said data is authenticated, said method comprising the stepsof: (a) reading the data from said media; (b) detecting the modulationof the at least one of said pit depth, pit width and pit track; (c)deriving an embedded authentication key or component thereof responsiveto said detecting step (b); (d) comparing the embedded authenticationkey or component thereof to at least one authentication key or componentthereof; (e) authenticating at least one of said media and said dataresponsive to said comparing step (d); and (f) outputting said data asat least one of audio, video, audio data, video data and digital datasubstantially free of the modulation of the at least one of the pitdepth, pit width and pit track.
 2. A method according to claim 1,wherein said deriving step (c) derives the embedded authentication keyor component thereof as a combination of on-off binary codesrepresenting ones and zeros to represent a predetermined pattern.
 3. Amethod according to claim 1, wherein said outputting step (f) furtherincludes the step of converting said data into a stereo analog signalwithout transferring, in the data, the modulation of the at least one ofthe pit depth, pit width and pit track used to derive the embeddedauthentication key or component thereof.
 4. A method according to claim1, and further including the step of: (g) physically altering the atleast one of pit depth, pit width and pit track of the media on at leastone of a per track basis and interval basis throughout said media suchthat said authentication step (e) is performed for at least one of eachtrack to be played, throughout playback and throughout recording.
 5. Amethod according to claim 1, wherein said authenticating step (e)further includes a step of authenticating using a differentauthentication key or component thereof for each disc track.
 6. A methodaccording to claim 1, said method comprises the step of authenticatingthe at least one of the data and the media via at least two differentauthentication keys, each of which successively must be authenticatedbefore said data is finally output via said outputting step (f).
 7. Amethod according to claim 1, wherein said method authenticates the atleast one of the media and the data over a plurality of interconnectedcomputer networks comprising at least one of a local network, globalnetwork and Internet.
 8. A method according to claim 1, wherein saidauthenticating step (e) further includes a step of using at least threedifferent sources for compiling long or compound authentication keys. 9.A method according to claim 1 wherein said deriving step (c) furthercomprises the step of at least one of decoding and decrypting-theembedded authentication key or component thereof.
 10. A method accordingto claim 1 wherein said comparing step (d) further comprises the step ofcomparing a modulated signal derived from at least one of pit depth, pitwidth and pit track modulation, to a table of valid modulated signalsderived from at least one of pit depth, pit width and pit trackmodulation.
 11. In a method for authenticating at least one of a mediaand data stored on said media, in order to prevent at least one ofpiracy, unauthorized access and unauthorized copying of the data storedon said media, a data disc comprising media that is modulated via atleast one of pit depth, pit width and pit track comprising at least oneauthentication key or component thereof for authenticating whether atleast one of said media and said data is authenticated.
 12. In a methodfor authenticating at least one of a media and data stored on saidmedia, in order to prevent at least one of piracy, unauthorized accessand unauthorized copying of the data stored on said media, wherein saidmedia is modulated via at least one of pit depth, pit width and pittrack comprising at least one authentication key or component thereof,for authenticating whether the at least one of said media and said datais authenticated, a data player comprising a data processor performingthe steps of: (a) reading the data from said media; (b) detecting themodulation of the at least one of pit depth, pit width and pit track;(c) deriving an embedded authentication key or component thereofresponsive to said detecting step (b); (d) comparing the embeddedauthentication key or component thereof to at least one authenticationkey or component thereof; (e) authenticating at least one of said mediaand said data responsive to said comparing (d) step; and (f) outputtingsaid data as at least one of audio, video, audio data, video data anddigital data substantially free of the modulation of the at least one ofthe pit depth, pit width and pit track.
 13. In a method forauthenticating at least one of a media and data to be stored on saidmedia, in order to prevent at least one of piracy, unauthorized accessand unauthorized copying of the data stored on said media, a datamessage comprising modulation via at least one of pit depth, pit widthand pit track comprising at least one authentication key or componentthereof lo for authenticating whether said data message isauthenticated, and wherein the modulation of the at least one of the pitdepth, pit width and pit track cannot be readily altered, obscured norremoved from said data without simultaneously degrading or impairing aquality of an audible component of said data message, and wherein thedata message is transmitted substantially free of the modulation of theat least one of the pit depth, pit width and pit track, therebypreventing a destination processor from reading and subsequentlyauthenticating the data message.
 14. A system for authenticating atleast one of a media and data stored on said media, in order to preventat least one of piracy, unauthorized access and unauthorized copying ofthe data stored on said media, wherein said media is modulated via atleast one of pit depth, pit width and pit track comprising at least oneauthentication key or component thereof for authenticating whether atleast one of said media and said data is authenticated, said systemincluding a data player containing a data processor comprising: (a)first detecting means for detecting all pit modulated data from a datastream; (b) second detecting means for determining authentication keydata that has been pit depth modulated based on a physicalcharacteristic of a data disc; (c) third detecting means for determiningauthentication key data that has been pit width modulated based on aphysical characteristic of a data disc; (d) fourth detecting means fordetermining authentication key data that has been pit track modulatedbased on a physical characteristic of a data disc; wherein the first,second, third and fourth detecting means are interconnected via a focusserver, tracking server, laser, lens and mirror, further comprising aportion of a disc reader housed in a data player device.
 15. The datadisc of claim 11, wherein the authentication key or component thereof isderived as a combination of on-off binary codes representing ones andzeros to represent a predetermined pattern.
 16. The data disc of claim11, wherein the media is modulated via at least one of pit depth, pitwidth and pit track on at least one of a per track basis and an intervalbasis throughout said media such that the data is authenticated for atleast one of each track to be played, throughout playback and throughoutrecording.
 17. The data disc of claim 11, wherein the at least one ofsaid media and said data is authenticated using a differentauthentication key or component thereof for each disc track.
 18. Thedata disc of claim 11, wherein the at least one of said media and saiddata is authenticated using at least two different authentication keys,each of which successively must be authenticated before said data isfinally output.
 19. The data disc of claim 11, wherein the at least oneof said media and said data is authenticated over a plurality ofinterconnected computer networks comprising at least one of a localnetwork, global network, and Internet.
 20. The data disc of claim 11,wherein the at least one of said media and said data is authenticatedusing at least three different sources for compiling long or compoundauthentication keys.
 21. The data disc of claim 11, wherein saidauthentication key or component thereof is at least one of decoded anddecrypted.
 22. The data player of claim 12, wherein said deriving step(c) derives the embedded authentication key or component thereof as acombination of on-off binary codes representing ones and zeros torepresent a predetermined pattern.
 23. The data player of claim 12,wherein said outputting step (f) further includes the step of convertingsaid data into a stereo analog signal without transferring, in the data,the modulation of the at least one of the pit depth, pit width and pittrack used to derive the embedded authentication key or componentthereof.
 24. The data player of claim 12, wherein the data processorfurther performs the step of: (g) physically altering the at least oneof pit depth, pit width and pit track of the media on at least one of aper track basis and an interval basis throughout said media such thatsaid authentication step (e) is performed for at least one of each trackto be played, throughout playback and throughout recording.
 25. The dataplayer of claim 12, wherein said authentication step (e) furtherincludes a step of authenticating using a different authentication keyor component thereof for each disc track.
 26. The data player of claim12, wherein the data processor further performs the step ofauthenticating the at least one of the data and the media via at leasttwo different authentication keys, each of which successively must beauthenticated before said data is finally output via said outputtingstep (f).
 27. The data player of claim 12, wherein the data processorfurther performs the step of authenticating the at least one of the dataand the media over a plurality of interconnected computer networkscomprising at least one of a local network, global network and Internet.28. The data player of claim 12, wherein said authenticating step (e)further includes a step of using at least three different sources forcompiling long or compound authentication keys.
 29. The data player ofclaim 12, wherein said deriving step (c) further comprises the step ofat least one of decoding and decrypting the embedded authentication keyor component thereof.
 30. The data player of claim 12, wherein saidcomparing step (d) further comprises the step of comparing a modulatedsignal derived from at least one of pit depth, pit width and pit trackmodulation, to a table of valid modulated signals derived from at leastone of pit depth, pit width and pit track modulation.
 31. The datamessage of claim 13, wherein the authentication key or component thereofis derived as a combination of on-off binary codes representing ones andzeros to represent a predetermined pattern.
 32. The data message ofclaim 13, wherein modulation via at least one of pit depth, pit widthand pit track is on at least one of a per track basis and an intervalbasis throughout said media such that the data is authenticated for atleast one of each track to be played, throughout playback and throughoutrecording.
 33. The data message of claim 13, wherein said data messageis authenticated using a different authentication key or componentthereof for each disc track.
 34. The data message of claim 13, whereinsaid data message is authenticated using at least two differentauthentication keys, each of which successively must be authenticatedbefore said data is finally output.
 35. The data message of claim 13,wherein said data message is authenticated over a plurality ofinterconnected computer networks comprising at least one of a localnetwork, global network, and Internet.
 36. The data message of claim 13,wherein said data message is authenticated using at least threedifferent sources for compiling long or compound authentication keys.37. The data message of claim 13, wherein said authentication key orcomponent thereof is at least one of decoded and decrypted.
 38. Thesystem of claim 14, wherein the authentication key or component thereofis derived as a combination of on-off binary codes representing ones andzeros to represent a predetermined pattern.
 39. The system of claim 14,wherein the media is modulated via at least one of pit depth, pit widthand pit track on at least one of a per track basis and an interval basisthroughout said media such that the data is authenticated for at leastone of each track to be played, throughout playback and throughoutrecording.
 40. The system of claim 14, wherein the at least one of saidmedia and said data is authenticated using a different authenticationkey or component thereof for each disc track.
 41. The system of claim14, wherein the at least one of said media and said data isauthenticated using at least two different authentication keys, each ofwhich successively must be authenticated before said data is finallyoutput.
 42. The system of claim 14, wherein the at least one of saidmedia and said data is authenticated over a plurality of interconnectedcomputer networks comprising at least one of a local network, globalnetwork, and Internet.
 43. The system of claim 14, wherein the at leastone of said media and said data is authenticated using at least threedifferent sources for compiling long or compound authentication keys.44. The system of claim 14, wherein said authentication key or componentthereof is at least one of decoded and decrypted.